Individual versus group strategy-proofness : when do they coincide?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 145.2010, 5, p. 1648-1674
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
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