Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Severinov, Sergei ; Kosenok, Grigory |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Subject: | mechanism design | individual rationality | ex-post budget balancing | surplus allocation | informed principal |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Society for Economic Dynamics 2004 Number 633 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem.
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