Individuals and organizations as sources of state effectiveness, and consequences for policy design
Michael Carlos Best (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research & CEPR), Jonas Hjort (Columbia University & BREAD & NBER), David Szakonyi (George Washington University & Higher School of Economics)
| Year of publication: |
April 11, 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Best, Michael ; Hjort, Jonas ; Szakonyi, David |
| Institutions: | Columbia University / Department of Economics (issuing body) |
| Publisher: |
[New York, NY] : Department of Economics, Columbia University |
| Subject: | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Bürokratie | Bureaucracy | Beamte | Civil servants | Effizienz | Efficiency | Markteintritt | Market entry | Patronage | Clientelism | Schätzung | Estimation | Russland | Russia | 2011-2015 |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten) Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.7916/d8-4w9m-sy97 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012056381