Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation
This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Guillen, Pablo ; Fatas, Enrique ; Brañas-Garza, Pablo |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Psychology. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870. - Vol. 31.2010, 6, p. 872-883
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Social dilemmas Conditional cooperation |
Saved in:
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