Inefficient R&D in public procurement : negative consequences of a separation between award and actual contract

Dieter Bös

In public procurement a temporal separation between award and actual contract allows private entrepreneurs who did not get the award to sue to become contractor. Hence, not only the award-winning entrepreneur, but also the losers will engage in relationship-specific investments. Unfortunately, in such a situation it is impossible to find fixed prices which guarantee the achievement of both efficient trade and efficient investment.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Bös, Dieter
Publisher:	Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies
Subject:	Ausschreibung \| Competitive tendering \| Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Theorie der Unternehmung \| Theory of the firm \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	14 S
Series:	CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 208
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Literaturverz. S. 13 - 14 Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/208.pdf verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001440830