Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision

We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Boyer, Pierre C.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 127.2015, C, p. 61-63
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Public-goods provision \| Comparative statics \| Utilitarian welfare maximization

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods ; H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189558