Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis
The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games which - studied in isolation - yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agents' ability to discriminate between games. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Güth, Werner ; Napel, Stefan |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 116.2006, 514, p. 1037-1056
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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