Inequity Aversion in Tournaments

We consider the cost of providing incentives using tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly. The principal never benefits from empathy to align incentives in a moral hazard framework between the workers, but he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when the costs are high, less envious ones when they are low

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Demougin, Dominique ; Fluet, Claude
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Einkommensverteilung \| Income distribution \| Soziale Beziehungen \| Social relations \| Experiment \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2003 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.409560 [DOI]
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J4 - Particular Labor Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084767