Inexperienced and experienced players in an oligopolistic market game with minimal information
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Nagel, Rosemarie ; Vriend, Nicolaas J. |
Published in: |
Industrial and corporate change. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0960-6491, ZDB-ID 1112650-4. - Vol. 8.1999, 1, p. 41-65
|
Subject: | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Konsumgüter | Consumer goods | Produktion | Production | Lernen | Learning | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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