Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

Susanne Goldluecke and Sebastian Kranz

In this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Goldluecke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Kontrolle \| Control \| Geld \| Money \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (38 S., 456 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 332
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/93777 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822746