Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers.
This paper compares the relative effectiveness of inflation contracts and inflation targets in the presence of uncertainty regarding the central bank's preferences and the underlying output target. The model explains why discretion may be superior to a delegation solution. The author also shows that there might be the need to combine inflation targets and contracts with the appointment of a Rogoff-type 'conservative' central banker if contracts and targets cannot be made state-contingent and that less flexible inflation targets may be appropriate with uncertain central bank preferences. Copyright 1999 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Muscatelli, V Anton |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 66.1999, 262, p. 241-54
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Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
freely available
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