Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction

If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

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Year of publication:	2008-10
Authors:	Wambach, Achim
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	Descending auction \| Dutch auction \| First price sealed bid auction \| Information acquisition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 7023
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504666