Information and preference aggregation
We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.
Year of publication: |
1999-11-15
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Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 17.2000, 1, p. 3-24
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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