Information and targeted spending
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Eguia, Jon X. ; Nicolò, Antonio |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - The Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 14.2019, 2, p. 373-402
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Publisher: |
The Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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