Information at equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2000-02-01
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Authors: | MINELLI, Enrico ; POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | Nash equilibrium | rational expectations | common knowledge |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2000004 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Minelli, Enrico, (2001)
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Minelli, E., (2003)
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Privileged information exacerbates market volatility.
Desgranges, Gabriel, (2011)
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Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks
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MINELLI, Enrico, (1993)
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