Information at Equilibrium.

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by strategies of other individuals: the elementary acts of other individuals at each state fo the world. At a Nash game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially summetris: the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information, and their acts are common knowledge.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Minelli, E. ; Polemarchakis, H.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	EXPECTATIONS \| INFORMATION \| LEARNING

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	12 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634162