Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
We propose a simple model of repeated games with private monitoring and time-varying information structures. We then obtain an example demonstrating that the set of achievable equilibrium payoffs may shrink when players' information regarding opponents' information structures is increased.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kamada, Yuichiro ; Kominers, Scott Duke |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 2, p. 112-114
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Correlated signal structure Prisoner's dilemma Private monitoring Repeated game |
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