Information content of unsolicited credit ratings and incentives of rating agencies : a theory
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Byoun, Soku |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 33.2014, p. 338-349
|
Subject: | Unsolicited rating | Asymmetric information | Signaling | Subscriber-fee scheme | Issuer-fee scheme | Theorie | Theory | Kreditwürdigkeit | Credit rating | Asymmetrische Information | Ratingagentur | Rating agency | Signalling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationswert | Information value |
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