Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: A Game-Theoretical Perspective
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Frantz, Pascal ; Walker, Martin |
Published in: |
Journal of business finance & accounting : JBFA. - Oxford : Blackwell, ISSN 0306-686X, ZDB-ID 1929628. - Vol. 24.1997, 9-10, p. 1421-1432
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Saved in:
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