Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in M&A : Purchase Price Allocations, Press Releases and Business Press

In order to reduce information asymmetries in relation to a firm's current decisions and long-term strategy, firms must consistently provide information to stakeholders. This paper investigates intellectual capital (IC) information disclosed in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) provided through three different disclosure channels (voluntary press releases, related newspaper articles and subsequent mandatory corporate disclosures in the notes to the financial statements). For a sample of 215 randomly selected US and European M&As, we analyse 215 press releases, 1,025 newspaper articles, and 215 purchase price allocations. Our findings suggest that IC disclosure in press releases is not perceived as informative and qualitative forward-looking IC information in voluntary corporate disclosures appears to lack credibility. Moreover, we empirically demonstrate interdependencies across the three disclosure channels. The business press seems to filter IC information provided in press releases. The amount of IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statements is positively associated with prior IC disclosure in newspaper articles, but negatively associated with IC disclosure in press releases. The management of acquirer firms appear to pay attention to news coverage and public opinion. However, both voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures appear to substitute rather than complement each other