INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS <link rid="fn22">-super-* </link>
We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off-net price discrimination to induce a connectivity breakdown when calls originated and received are complements in the information exchange. This breakdown disappears if operators are allowed to negotiate reciprocal access charges. We also study the relationship between sending and receiving retail charges as a function of the level of access charges. We identify circumstances where private negotiations over access charges induce first-best retail prices. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | CAMBINI, CARLO ; VALLETTI, TOMMASO M. |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 56.2008, 4, p. 707-728
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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