Information in elections: Do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Andina-Díaz, Ascensión |
Published in: |
SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195. - Vol. 7.2016, 3, p. 307-339
|
Publisher: |
Heidelberg : Springer |
Subject: | Electoral competition | Heterogeneous voters | Information transmission | Voting | Coalition governments |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s13209-016-0143-8 [DOI] 869001965 [GVK] hdl:10419/158559 [Handle] |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Information in elections : do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?
Andina-Díaz, Ascensión, (2016)
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Like biases and information in elections
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Hiding Information in Electoral Competition
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