Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions
This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information.Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of <italic>existing</italic> shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest “myopically”, choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce “early” cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that produce “late” cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Thakor, Anjan V. |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 28.1993, 04, p. 459-482
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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