Information provision before a contract is offered
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Jaesoo ; Shin, Dongsoo |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 124.2014, 3, p. 490-493
|
Subject: | Agency contracting | Information provision | Information rent | Vertrag | Contract | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsversorgung |
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