Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
Svetlana Kosterina
| Year of publication: |
2023
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kosterina, Svetlana |
| Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 75.2023, 2, p. 493-522
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| Subject: | Condorcet jury theorem | Elections | Information aggregation | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Wahl | Election | Aggregation | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00199-022-01412-w [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226653