Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring
If the owner of a firm cannot commit ex-ante to monitor his workers and the monitoring technology may accuse a diligent worker of shirking (produce a “false positive”), the lack of commitment problem is extremely severe : the worker may shirk even if monitoring is costless. However, the same presence of false positives is necessary for this commitment problem to be fully resolved either through delegation of monitoring or through contracting with a passive third party.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | OLIVELLA, Pau |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1995, 39, p. 1-32
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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