Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
Year of publication: |
2001-09
|
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Pesendorfer, Martin |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Optimal Auction | Private Values | Information Structures | Partitions |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | CFP 1218. Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2007), 137: 580-609 The price is None Number 1323 47 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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