INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT
I consider an election with candidate entry and a state variable that affects all players’ utility, as it translates their ideal points. Candidates are informed of the realization of the state, whilst voters are not. I study the effect of candidates’ commitment on equilibria. I show that if they cannot commit, their private information is of no consequence for the election (i.e. even in a decisiontheoretic sense). Instead, when they can commit this is a standard signaling game.
Year of publication: |
2005-04
|
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Authors: | Rodríguez, Carlos Maravall |
Institutions: | Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
Saved in:
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