Informational Disadvantage and Bargaining Power

We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the total surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Ko, Sung-Hyuk ; Jun, Byoung Heon
Institutions:	Institute of Economic Research, Korea University
Subject:	alternating offer bargaining \| stochastic surplus \| informational disadvantage

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 0711
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835254