Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.

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Year of publication:	2002-07-30
Authors:	McLean, Richard ; Postlewaite, Andrew
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Subject:	Auctions \| Incentive Compatibility \| Mechanism Design \| Interdependent Values

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	PIER Working Paper Archive.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	27 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D44 - Auctions ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102109