Informative versus persuasive advertising in a dynamic hotelling monopoly

Luca Lambertini

A dynamic Hotelling monopoly model is proposed, with the purpose of characterising the effects of informative and persuasive advertising in a regime of partial market coverage. The two models are solved to show the emergence of a unique saddle-point steady-state equilibrium in both cases. Then, equilibrium profits are compared to illustrate that the firm's preferences on the type of advertising effort to be adopted strictly depend on initial conditions.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Lambertini, Luca
Published in:	Theory. - Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-3-030-40097-2. - 2020, p. 249-264
Subject:	Advertising \| Discrete choice theory \| Monopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Werbung \| Monopol \| Diskrete Entscheidung \| Discrete choice \| Hotellerie \| Hotel industry

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz im Buch ; Book section
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-3-030-40098-9_10 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297650