Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives

It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.

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Year of publication:	2007-02
Authors:	Fleckinger, Pierre
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Informed Principal \| Countervailing Incentives \| Risk Neutrality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00607075 Published, Economics Letters, 2007, 94, 2, 240-244
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635017