Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights.
The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing its response into four items: (1) terms of trade; (2) production composition; (3) available products; and (4) intertemporal allocation of consumption The paper proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two elements. The following two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, foreign direct investment is added to the model. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Helpman, Elhanan |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 61.1993, 6, p. 1247-80
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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