Insider Trading and Market Manipulations: A Weak Invisible Hand Result

In this paper, we consider a Kyle type model of insider trading. We show that: i) there exists a unique equilibrium independently of the distribution of uncertainty; ii) this equilibrium minimizes the expected gains of the insider under incentive compatibility constraints. We extend our results to models of market manipulations and to a class of signalling games.

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Year of publication:	1990-11
Authors:	Rochet, Jean-Charles ; Vila, Jean-Luc
Institutions:	European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Subject:	Insider Trading \| Market Manipulations \| Signalling Games \| Auction Market \| Dealer Market

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Series:	CEPR Financial Markets Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Available in print. The price is 4.00 pounds or 8.00 dollars per paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256378