Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
Year of publication: |
December 2015
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Authors: | Tergiman, Chloe |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 18.2015, 4, p. 697-717
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Subject: | Multilateral legislative bargaining | Vote of confidence procedure | Proposer power | Experiment | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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