Institution Design for Macroeconomic Policy
Year of publication: |
2015-02-05
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Authors: | Mihailov, Alexander ; Ullrich, Katrin |
Institutions: | Henley Business School, University of Reading |
Subject: | delegation | independence | expert committees | monetary-fiscal interactions | policy games | institution design |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number em-dp2015-01 52 pages |
Classification: | E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization |
Source: |
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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Mihailov, Alexander, (2007)
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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Mihailov, Alexander, (2008)
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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Mihailov, Alexander, (2007)
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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Mihailov, Alexander, (2008)
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The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency
Farvaque, Etienne, (2011)
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Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data
Farvaque, Etienne, (2011)
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