Institutional Determinants of Economic Policymaking in Latin America 1978-2006 : Legislative Bargaining, Separation of Powers, and Fiscal Policy
This paper aims to evaluate the effect of different institutional designs on the economic policymaking process and outcomes. I focus on the bargaining between executive and legislative branches of government over the definition of fiscal policy under separation of powers in presidential regimes. Using data for 17 countries in Latin America between 1977 and 2006, I argue that economic policymaking process in the region can be analyzed as a situation in which, facing strong external shocks and pressures, different agents with heterogeneous policy preferences get into a conflict over the distribution of political power and economic benefits derived from any economic policy change. I hypothesize that: i) the size of the government and opposition coalition in congress shapes the timing of the economic policymaking, ii) closed-list proportional representation systems creates strong incentives for partisan discipline, reduces the number of veto players, and facilitates legislative approval of governmentメs economic policy, iii) open-list proportional representation systems creates strong incentives for personalistic, less disciplined, and clientelistic political parties, it increases the number of veto players, and make economic policymaking process more difficult and costly. I conclude that the probability of adopting new fiscal programs and policies is shaped by the number of (partisan) veto players and the characteristics of the government legislative coalition
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor |
Publisher: |
[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Lateinamerika | Latin America | Gewaltenteilung | Separation of powers | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Theorie | Theory | Wirtschaftspolitik | Economic policy | Gesetzgebung | Legislation |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
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