Institutional Inertia

We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce e

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Valderrama, Laura
Publisher:	Washington : International Monetary Fund
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Institutioneller Wandel \| Institutional change \| Institutionenökonomik \| Institutional economics \| Institutionelle Infrastruktur \| Institutional infrastructure

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (56 p)
Series:	IMF Working Papers ; v.Working Paper No. 09/193 IMF working paper ; WP/09/193
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Description based upon print version of record Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. A Tale of Explorers, Gold, and Diamonds; III. The Model; A. The Cooperative; 1. Redistribution (date 2 vote); 2. Technology choice (date 1 vote); 3. Example: Voting for an inefficient polarized technology; B. Outside Ownership; C. Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership; IV. Institutional Inertia; V. Discussion; A. Supporting Evidence; B. Implications for Institutional Design; VI. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes
ISBN:	978-1-4518-7340-5 ; 978-1-4527-2181-1 ; 978-1-4518-7340-5
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012677861