Institutional Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem in African Health Care
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Leonard, Kenneth L. ; Leonard, David K. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Afrika | Africa | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (51 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 1998 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.137443 [DOI] |
Classification: | D2 - Production and Organizations ; I1 - Health ; O2 - Development Planning and Policy |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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