Institutions and Soft Budget Constraints

This paper presents a model of soft budget constraints (SBC) in a bank lending relationship, emphasizing the role of institutions in shaping the SBC phenomena. The model allows two types of SBC to emerge according to specific constellations of parameters: the SBC as a dynamic commitment problem and the SBC as an external assistance problem. The paper sheds light on issues such as the political intervention in private contracts, the design of bankruptcy procedures, the cross-subsidization among social groups through the credit system, and the privately-owned versus State-owned bank dichotomy

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bergara, Mario
Other Persons:	Ponce, Jorge (contributor) ; Zipitria, Leandro (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Budgetrestriktion \| Budget constraint \| Theorie \| Theory \| Institutionenökonomik \| Institutional economics \| Systemtransformation \| Economic transition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (26 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Review of Accounting, Banking and Finance, 2011 Summer, vol. 3(2): 41-66 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 6, 2011 erstellt
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105577