Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Bovenberg, A.L. ; Teulings, Coen N. |
Publisher: |
Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute |
Subject: | Unternehmensversicherung | Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Theorie | Insurance | implicit contracts | moral hazard | principal agent | commitment | shirking |
Series: | Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 01-020/3 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 83421797X [GVK] hdl:10419/86102 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20010020 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device
Bovenberg, Ary Lans, (2001)
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A.L., (2001)
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A Lans, (2002)
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
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Funded pensions and intergenerational and international risk sharing in general equilibrium
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Bovenberg, A.L., (2003)
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