Insurance-markets equilibrium with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages

Aleksandar Vasilev

The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

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Year of publication:	[2018]
Authors:	Vasilev, Aleksandar
Publisher:	[Kiel : ZBW
Subject:	Indivisible labor \| Lotteries \| Insurance \| Unobservable effort \| fair wages \| Arbeitsangebot \| Labour supply \| Effizienzlohn \| Efficiency wages \| Lohn \| Wages \| Arbeitsmarkttheorie \| Labour market theory \| Glücksspiel \| Gambling \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 10 Seiten) Illustrationen
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/183615 [Handle]
Classification:	E1 - General Aggregative Models ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011953797