Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk.
Systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank's economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions. Banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims, or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks' liquidity management. This paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations. It develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring. In this context, the paper derives the optimal prudential rules, and, in particular, looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks. Last, it provides conditions which a Too Big To Fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank's liquidity shock throughout the financial system. Copyright 1996 by Ohio State University Press.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Rochet, Jean-Charles ; Tirole, Jean |
Published in: |
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. - Blackwell Publishing. - Vol. 28.1996, 4, p. 733-62
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Publisher: |
Blackwell Publishing |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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