Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder

We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Kim, Jinwoo
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Seoul Journal of Economics 29 (No. 2 2016): 151-163 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 30, 2016 erstellt
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990803