Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations : do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict?
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Aaldering, Hillie ; Greer, Lindred L. ; Kleef, Gerben A. Van ; Dreu, Carsten K. W. de |
Published in: |
Organizational behavior and human decision processes : a journal of fundamental research and theory in applied psychology. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0749-5978, ZDB-ID 629198-3. - Vol. 120.2013, 2, p. 240-250
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Subject: | Personality | Cooperation | Competition | Altruism | Principal agent theory | Social value orientation | Altruismus | Soziale Werte | Social values | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Soziales Verhalten | Social behaviour | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experiment | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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