Internal versus external CEO choice and the structure of compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Palomino, Frédéric ; Peyrache, Eloic |
Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0022-1090, ZDB-ID 219406-5. - Vol. 48.2013, 4, p. 1301-1331
|
Subject: | Führungskräfteauswahl | Executive selection | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory |
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