International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting
This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of "global" pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2005 .
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Buchholz, Wolfgang ; Haupt, Alexander ; Peters, Wolfgang |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 107.2005, 1, p. 175-195
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision
Buchholz, Wolfgang, (2014)
-
International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design
Buchholz, Wolfgang, (2012)
-
International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design
Buchholz, Wolfgang, (2013)
- More ...