International environmental agreements for river sharing problems
Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
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Authors: | Houba, Harold ; Laan, Gerard van der ; Zeng, Yuyu |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 62.2015, 4, p. 855-872
|
Subject: | International environmental agreements | River sharing problem | Negotiations | Coalitional bargaining game | Markov perfect equilibrium | Efficiency | Monopoly | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Wasserversorgung | Water supply |
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