International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits : repeated games analysis
Year of publication: |
February 2017
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Authors: | Takashima, Nobuyuki |
Published in: |
Economic modelling. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993, ZDB-ID 86824-3. - Vol. 61.2017, p. 312-320
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Subject: | international environmental agreements | subgame perfect equilibrium | renegotiation-proofrepeated game | ancillary benefits | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Luftreinhaltung | Air pollution control |
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