International environmental agreements with consistent conjectures
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
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Authors: | Gelves, Alejandro ; McGinty, Matthew |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 78.2016, p. 67-84
|
Subject: | International environmental agreements | Consistent conjectures | Coalition formation | Public goods | Externalities | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Öffentliche Güter | Externer Effekt |
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